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Abstract. This project investigates the relationship between local and global practices of security. 
By employing a Foucauldian perspective, I analyse how a specific governmentality is 
conditioning the practices and discourses of local frameworks for security governance, through an 
analysis of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development’s Strategy for Peace and Security 
(IPSS) on the Horn of Africa. I examine, first, how a liberal rationale has emerged as a 
transnational truth of security. Second, I analyse how this rationale is visible in the formation of 
early response mechanisms, rapid response units and citizen diplomacy as practices of security on 
the Horn of Africa. Third, and last, I discuss what this entails for political agency, and 
specifically how we are to think ethically about global security responses today.  
 
Introduction 
 
We have inherited an onto-theology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the 
existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a 
widespread, metaphysical belief in it. 
James Der Derian (1993: 95) 
 
Problem Area 
Recently, the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union (AU) argued that while 
‘narratives of ground breaking economic growth … dominates the headlines, pronouncing this 
second decade of the new millennium as Africa’s’ at the same time ‘violent conflict continues to 
plague many parts of [the] continent requiring … constant vigilance and effective response’ 
(Chergui 2014: 10). This is perhaps no more the case than with the Horn of Africa (HoA)i which 
is experiencing the continued insurgency by the Lord’s Resistance Army and Al-Shabaab 
alongside famine, war, and widespread ethnic- and religious conflict (Mesfin 2011). While 
history tends to present Africa as a political problem to be solved by external actors, the African 
Union seem to have now taken the lead in addressing political issues on the HoA and the wider 
continent, and seeks to ensure ‘far-reaching changes in the norms and institutions governing 
Africa’s inter-state relations’ (Chergui 2014: 10). The most prominent example is the African 
Peace- and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA has adopted the principle of ‘non-
indifference’, breaking away from the principle of non-intervention on the African continent, and 
aligning it with the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ charter. Under this framework, in addition to 
diplomatic initiatives and mediation attempts, the AU sanctions unconstitutional changes of 
government and leads its own peace support operations. One might thus view the APSA as part of 
a transformation from state security towards a liberal framework of security governance where 
the right of the individual trumps the sovereign (Freedman 2005).  
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Following 9/11, the way in which threats to liberal life is portrayed as global has speeded up and 
intensified political and technological measures of control, the aim of which is to categorize and 
divide bodies to essentially target, discipline and punish certain forms of life deemed threatening 
(Reid & Dillon 2009; Hardt and Negri 2004; Butler 2009; Agamben 2008). In this political 
rationality, African nations can now longer merely be viewed by policy makers as poor and 
underdeveloped, but must also be treated as sites of emergence of global security threats. This 
shift in security governmentality informs and transverses all fields of politics, merging as 
different issues as drought, poverty, civil war, ethnic conflict and terrorism within the prism of 
security (Duffield 2007; Bachmann & Hönke 2009; Bagoyoko & Gibert 2009; Ingram 2011). 
Consequently, the  articulation of, and interventions into the Horn as a site of emergence of 
global security threats happens in a complex field of different security practices that is at the 
same time local and global. Based on this, I suggest that we analyse the APSA within a 
governmentality framework. This approach not only critically examines the governance of 
security on the Horn of Africa. It also addresses a lack in the critical study of international 
politics today which ‘mistakes Western experiences for the universal, thus failing to take note of 
different insecurities and responses in other locales’ (Bilgin, 2010: 619). As Mbembe and Nutall 
(2004: 348) suggests, Africa has become a sign in public debates for the ‘other’, the ‘failed’, the 
‘incomplete’ and something apart from the worldii. Therefore we must instead engage in a 
‘worlding’ of the African experience, and critically examine the relationship between local and 
global practices of security rather than presume their uniformity. Such a study can unveil whether 
and how a certain global governmentality is appropriated and enforced in “local” practices of 
security through relations that are multiple and heterogeneous rather than singular and 
homogenous. Therefore, I state the following problem formulation: 
How are practices and discourses of regional security governance on the Horn of Africa 
conditioned by a liberal governmentality, and with what consequences? 
To answer this I shall proceed to outline a theoretical framework that allow us  to understand 1) 
security policies as a specific, liberal governmentality, or technique of governance connecting 
certain forms of knowledge, practices and discourses, and 2) how this particular governmentality 
is articulated in international politics.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
In his work, Michel Foucault developed a comprehensive theory of power. To Foucault, power 
requires freedom to be in effect; any social relation that does not exist between “free” individuals 
would more accurately de described as a relation of force or domination. While power is certainly 
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hierarchical it is neither limited by the geographical- nor the legal boundaries of the state; power 
is omnidirectional and omnipresent. It is ‘not an institution, nor a structure, nor a possession’ but 
rather ‘the name we give to a complex strategic situation in a particular society’ (Foucault 1998: 
93). Power should not be understood as oppression. It is rather productive; constitutive of 
discourses, knowledge, and subjectivities. (Foucault 1970: 168). An understanding of security as 
a form of governmentality thus entails analyzing it as a strategic effect of specific relations of 
power, knowledge, and subjectivity. Security is not a response to a universal human need but a 
product of a dominant epistemé that defines the possibility of knowledge at a given time in 
history (ibid). The most important question one must ask is ‘how do specific problematizations of 
risks and threats connect to certain forms of knowledge, practices, technologies [to create] 
assemblages of (in-) security that even amplify each other’? (Wichum 2013: 165). Foucault 
described this dispositif of security as 
a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical and moral propositions (Foucault 1977: 194). 
Defining security as a dispositif entails an epistemological examination of security that looks for 
‘the conditions of possibility of (moral) orders of security in contemporary societies’ (Wichum 
2013: 165).  
In the transition from sovereignty to liberal forms of rule, Foucault identified a new logic of 
governance that shifted the focus from disciplinary measures of exceptional punishment to the 
continuous management of populations. Here, we move from governmentality to 
Governmentality, understood as a specific technique of rule in liberal societies where power is 
de-centered and where the individual is no longer an object of control under sovereign power, but 
a self-governing subject. This form of self-governance should not be seen as total autonomy, but 
describes rather the subject as always and already constituted by ‘institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections … which has as its target populations … and as its essential technical 
means apparatuses [or dispositif] of security (Foucault 1991: 102-103, emphasis added). It 
becomes unsatisfactory then to view the political move towards ‘security’ as a state project aimed 
towards the well-being of a population. Security is the name given to an ethos enacted not by a 
single actor, but by a relational, moving field of actions (Huysmans 1998; Bigo 2012).  
Governmentality presupposes that ‘power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon 
citizens as of ‘‘making up’’ citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom’ (Miller & 
Rose 2008: 768). Security practices are not only installed to protect the individual, but to make a 
mass of citizens efficient, healthy, and productive; expecting compliance and obedience in return 
(Foucault 2003: 242-245). As such, Governmentality does not entail the disappearance of 
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sovereignty and discipline, but is rather a technique of governance which hides itself behind 
freedom, and gives practices of punishment a ‘context in which it appears to be free of all excess 
and violence’ (Ibid: 302). In spite of this, one should not ignore how liberal forms of rule 
mobilise and rely upon violence, coercion, and punishment (Death 2013: 768). In fact, it is the 
existence of forms of violence and coercion in the face of the birth of the free subject in 
modernity that is one central problematics in the grid of Governmentality studies. Certainly, the 
way in which threats to ‘freedom’ today are portrayed as omnipresent has fuelled and intensified 
the implementation of political and technological measures of control. Yet, even in the aftermath 
of 9/11, the result cannot be said to have been the emergence of a world order, where the West is 
simply enforcing a political paradigm through relations of domination (Reid 2005). Of interest is 
rather the way Governmentality transverses and juxtapositions local governance, agency and 
capacity building with practices of coercion and violence through a certain rationality of security 
(Hönke 2012; Gabay & Death 2012). This ‘implies moving beyond the static analytics of 
‘bounded units’ and ‘fixed territorial spaces’ and locate local frameworks of security governance 
in an essentially transnational and transcultural process that is at once ‘shaping and reorganizing 
always entangled local and global power relations’ (Hönke & Müller 2012: 386).  
 
Methodology & Outline 
With the regional framework for security governance on the Horn of Africa as its area of focus, 
the aim of this report is to provide an ‘analytics of government’ which analyses the manner in 
which a global governmentality is constituted through rationalised and calculated practices of 
localised governance – focusing here on the institutionalised, regional governance of security. 
First, my aim is critical examination rather than problem solving. I wish to provide an analysis of 
fields of security governance and their relations rather than alternative policy responses. 
Secondly, since I regard governance and security as being constituted through systems of 
relations I do not seek to account for the motivations and strategic concerns for the actors 
involved, but to uncover the strategic effects security has on the possibilities of (global) 
governance.  The epistemological premis of this project lies within the philosophical presump-
tions of poststructuralism. Today, the majority of scholars within this school follow Foucault’s 
conception of knowledge as relatively rule-bound sets of statements which impose limits on what 
gives meaning. It is in this light, we shall analyse security not as a condition, or an ontological 
fact but through the practices and discourses that it constitutes. This provides a unique account of 
the relationship between the local and global dimensions of large-scale political projects that is 
‘not bound to a single field site’ but is ‘employed to trace social worlds and practices in multiple 
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sites of global security assemblages’ (Hönke & Müller 2012: 396). While some may find this 
approach problematic, an analytics of government approach as proposed here provides a powerful 
tool for analysing power relations in global politics and thus removes the division between ‘the 
west and the rest’ and investigates instead the degree to which forms of security governance 
coexist and interrelate with pratices of violence and coercion throughout the globe.  
To analyse the governmentality of security on the Horn of Africa I will divide the concept into 
four dimensions, as proposed by Dean (1999). The first dimension is fields of visibility which 
focuses on the clashes between competing governmental rationalities and the creation of 
particular visible fields of government alongside other invisible, ungoverned spaces. The second 
is regimes of knowledge which identifies the rationalities and mentalities at work in regimes of 
government; strategies that are calculated, weighed up, planned and justified. The third is 
techniques and technologies which focus on the methods and practices employed in governance 
processes such as auditing and benchmarking processes, ratings systems, development plans, 
sustainability strategies as well as imprisonment, surveillance, torture, war etc. The fourth 
category: forms of subjectification identify how techniques of governance conduct the conduct of 
free individuals through the constitution of a certain subjectivity. The analysis is divided in three 
parts. In the first, we shall map the field of transnational security governance to understand its 
discursive underpinnings. In the second, we shall analyse the dispositif of security on the Horn of 
Africa through the framework outlined above. In the third and last chapter, we shall discuss the 
conclusions of the analysis and seek to assess the consequences of these. 
 
The Global Security Dispositif  
 
Unveiling the Logic of Global Security 
While certainly, the relations of international politics is not defined by absolute integrations, the 
relations that are being forged between the various regimes of global governance is not 
insignificant; one might even speak of an ‘enlightened’ paradigm of politics defined by its 
regularized, codified and rational techniques of managing the global populace (James & Soguk 
2014). The specific emergence of a global framework for security governance is closely related to 
a shift in the way we portray and perceive the nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era. This 
shift has been fuelled by events such as the wars in Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the 
terrorist attacks on 9/11 which all demonstrated that the main source of conflict was not 
exclusively that of sovereign states. Subnational and transnational threats such as drug 
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trafficking, terrorism, piracy and civil war are generally understood as prominent (global) 
security threats today (Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde 1998). This shift in the sensibility of security 
has lifted the responsibility for the provision of security from the sovereign state to an 
international level which allows the international community to defy national sovereignty. 
Human security and the protection of life becomes defining for a globally articulated shift in 
security sensibility towards a liberal rationality (Axworthy 2001). The ‘securitization’ of the 
global field of politics means that networks are formed, practices are implemented and 
knowledge is shared and comes to influence policies and professionals across a wide ranging 
field of actors from militaries, policing, development programmes, humanitarian assistance, and 
diplomacy (Bigo 2008; Duffield 2007). By going global, security - and the techniques and 
technologies of governance it constitutes - comes to be positioned against an omnipresent, 
omnidirectional, inter-connected and internal form of threat, which might arise anywhere, at any 
moment (Hardt and Negri 2004). As ‘changing epistemologies re-problematise the world and our 
very sense of being individual and collective subjects, they also inform the changing conceptions 
of strategy which seek to govern how we act’. Dillon & Reid (2001) encapsulates the way in 
which a certain logic of governance creates an onto-theological, transnational truth of security 
through the embrace of complexity, connectivity and contingency. ‘Intimately allied with the 
globalisation of capital, but not entirely to be conflated with it’ Dillon and Reid suggests, ‘a new 
and diverse ensemble of power known as global liberal governance’ has emerged (Ibid: 41). This 
liberalist logic of governance comes to constitute strategies of security that claims to ‘know’ life 
through information, and thus hides its use of violence and punishment behind its “divine” 
insight. As specific forms of knowledge achieve the status of an ontological truth, so does 
specific conceptions of security. The same logic that applies to the globalisation of capital – 
interconnectivity, circulation, self-reliance – applies today also to the art of governing global 
relations. These complex networks of indirect control are less concerned with states and non-
governmental organisations as preformed subjects than it is with ‘knowledgeable strategies and 
tactics that effect the constitution of [subjectivies]’ (Ibid).  
 
Towards a Transnational ‘Truth’ of Security 
This marks a shift from the idea of colonialism and imperialism, founded in state sovereignty, as 
liberal governmentality is rather focused on ‘governing without government’ – i.e. a decreasing 
reliance on domestic use of force and legislation to protect the sovereign – to what Deleuze has 
referred to as a ‘politics of control’ (Deleuze 1992) which works through the structuring of ‘the 
desires, proprieties and possibilities that shape the operation of life, working on and through 
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subjective freedoms, governmental rationalities [which] typically develop around specific 
problematics, such as those of health, wealth, security, poverty, esteem, culture, sexuality or 
migration’ (Dillon & Reid 2001: 48). This political rationality of liberalism combined with the 
advent of natural science and new technologies have meant that the politics of security have taken 
as its referent object life understood specifically as species (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero 2009). As 
the natural sciences, and the understanding of the human race as a biological entity emerged, so 
emerged also new political techniques that examine, survey and seeks to manage the global 
populace so as to meet their needs and increase their life chances (Dillon & Reid 2001). 
Consequently spatial and temporal mappings and arrangements of what is or can be deemed 
‘secure’ are pursued by authorities, including imaginative practices of visualising the catastrophe, 
for example via the construction of ‘plausible scenarios’ (MacClanahan 2009). While risks and 
threats all have different causes, they are structurally similar under the umbrella of security 
governance and in the ‘range of policies, laws and practices that are to strengthen readiness and 
preparedness in all kinds of sectors’ (Aradau & Van Munster 2011: 25). Visualising futures 
becomes a matter of ‘creating affectively imbued representations that move and mobilize’ action 
in the present (Anderson 2011: 785).  
Thus, the politics of security moves from the realm of the visible knowns to the realm of the 
unknown (Aradau & Van Munster 2012; Collier 2008). Life comes to be defined as mass, and 
mass comes to be sets of data in virtual, simulated matrixes rather than fleshy bodies. As specific 
regimes of knowledge come to define life, security becomes a transcendental truth that allows for 
techniques and technologies that divide its objects of rule along lines of specific subjectivities. To 
monitor and interpret the movement of bodies on a global scale, the use of mathematical models 
and ‘dataveillance’ has become instrumental in security governance (Amoore & De Goede 2005). 
As Snowden’s revelations have all too clearly shown, institutional and technological frameworks 
with global reach have already been put in place with the aim to monitor, foresee and disrupt 
security threats. While Beck (2002: 43) claimed that we must view terrorism as a risk that goes 
‘beyond rational calculation into the realm of unpredictable turbulence’ security governance 
seeks to render the unknown future governable and actionable. As ‘security’ moves from the 
spatial formations of the sovereign state to the temporal mapping of the future, networks are 
formed across borders, professions and institutions that all become part of what Bigo (2002) has 
described as a late modern ‘governmentality of unease’ that encapsulates everything from 
migration, terrorism, natural disasters, environmental catastrophes, nuclear war etc. under the 
auspice of security. As such, the governmentality of unease gives birth to a matrix of security 
managers and agencies ‘who claim to possess a “truth” founded on numerical data and statistics, 
technologies of biometrics and sociological profiles’ (Bigo 2008: 7-8). Yet, before we dig deeper 
Daniel Møller Ølgaard 
Roskilde University 
~ 8 ~ 
 
into the problematiques these observations raise, we must analyse the localised dispositif of 
security on the Horn of Africa before proceeding to a discussion of how and with what 
consequences this is part of a (global) Governmentality of security. 
 
The Local Security Dispositif 
 
Governing Security on the Horn of Africa 
It should come as no surprise that there is a great degree of relations being forged between the 
UN and the AU on security governance in Africa. One of the results of this ‘shared strategic 
vision’ of ‘flexible and innovative’ interpretations of the UN’s Article VIII on the use of force, 
enhanced consultations, as well as increased collaborative missions is the formation of the 
African Peace- and Security Architecture (APSA) (TANA 2013: 21). The APSA is not only a 
physical structure of practices but the name given to a wide range of policies, funds, institutions, 
and practices whose main pillars consist of the Peace- and Security Council (PSC), the Panel of 
the Wise, the Peace Fund, the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Continental Early Warning 
System (CEWS). On the 3rd of October, 2011, The Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) signed an agreement with the AU constituting them as the regional partner in the 
implementation of the APSA on the Horn of Africa. This is also reflected in the IGAD Peace and 
Security Strategy (IPSS 2010). 
The discursive underpinnings of the IPSS include concepts such as human security, collectivism, 
and the subsidiary principle (Apuuli 2011: 360). Human security envisages security as consisting 
of several factors such as economic development, environmental resources, and public health. 
Collectivism entails the departure from state sovereignty towards addressing shared forms of 
‘dead capital’ (such as borderlands and unclaimed resources) into ‘security generating variables’ 
so as they will become contributing factors within the wider social- and political economy of the 
region rather than marginal. Clearly, a liberalist discourse is visible here. It is aimed not purely at 
economic growth rates on the macro level, but seeks to provide the adequate conditions for its 
population to thrive and improve. Yet, the subsidiary principle entails the ‘delegation of the 
provision of security to the authorities best suited to handle them’ (Ibid: 361, emphasis added). 
This entails that to provide ‘security-generating valuables’ to a thriving population, IGAD 
demands obedient and compliant subjects. 
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Early Warning & Rapid Response Mechanisms 
One of the initiatives under the IPSS is the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism 
(CEWARN) which employs open source intelligence, quantitative analysis, and constructs case 
scenarios, as well the formulation of possible responses. The techniques and technologies that are 
being promoted by the mechanism are based on quantitative forms of analysis. Information is 
gathered by so-called ‘Field Monitors’, channelled through national research institutes and local 
committees and then coded and analysed using a software program, the CEWARN Report, under 
the authority of the regional office in Addis Ababa. The program analyses as different incidents 
as raids, armed clashes, protest demonstrations, and banditry and analyses these using 52 
‘behavioural indicators’ and constructing from it structural simulations and forecasts which 
guides the IGAD head offices. Through the Rapid Response Fund, the CEWARN is also 
facilitating the establishment of several local Conflict Early Warning and Emergency Response 
Unit CEWERU which aim at preventing, responding to and managing conflicts on a local level. 
A certain regime of knowledge of security is applied here, which allows e.g. ‘violence’ and 
‘conflict’ to become quantifiable entities which can be categorized on the basis of their 
‘structural’ interpretation. The CEWARN promotes a governmentality based on ‘life as 
information’, where the movement of bodies and acts of violence are schematized, categorized 
and memorized. This governmentality, Foucault (1987) reminds us, operates on populations and 
seeks to promote life by demanding detailed knowledge of it. Populations as such become a 
political problem in the gaze of IGAD, the management of which necessitates a division between 
what is to be protected, and what is to be protected against. Here, CEWARN and CEWERU 
emerges as biopolitical technologies of governance which makes possible for surveillance and 
codification aimed at a wider population to translate into disciplinary, rapid measures of 
punishment under the guise of security. What might seem like spontaneous, chaotic, and sporadic 
acts of violence, disaster or catastrophe are fitted within a governmental framework that seeks to 
render the chaos of future risks manageable. By transforming the movement of bodies into data, 
these technologies render security an object of control, and aims to transform that which is 
incomprehensible or invisible into a field of visibility. By schematizing and codifying these sets of 
data, the CEWARN constructs a structural interpretation which makes possible the creation of 
future scenarios, and the possibilities that condition the governance of security are transformed 
spatially and temporally. This visibility should not be understood as certainty, but rather a reality 
constituted by a specific form of knowledge. 
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Preventive Diplomacy  
Another important track under the IPSS is ‘preventive diplomacy’, also referred to as ‘citizen 
diplomacy’. This form of conflict mediation is based on private citizens discussing issues that are 
traditionally reserved for state-level negotiations (Naidoo 2000) and seeks to integrate civil 
society organisations and community leaders into the mediation efforts performed on a state-level 
by IGAD in e.g. South Sudan. IGAD is currently setting up a Mediation Support Unit which 
consists of ‘a pool of former diplomats, eminent persons and traditional leaders’ who will be 
called upon to guide negotiation and mediate conflicts at community and state levels (IPSS 2010: 
Paragraph 17). Specifically, IGAD wishes to 1) put in place and operationalize an institutional 
and normative framework for preventive diplomacy; 2) engage in preventive diplomacy capacity 
building, research and mediation capacity development in accordance with the basic principles 
enshrined in this strategy; and 3) establish and operationalize a mediation support framework 
including a roster of mediators and a Panel of the Wise.  
Thus, citizen diplomacy constitutes specific forms of subjectivity. Through the use of experts, 
former diplomats and other external forms of consultants, civil society is “educated” to perform 
mediation, negotiation and conflict prevention in areas that were before invisible or 
ungovernable. By focusing on capacity building on a local level, and giving these subjects the 
tools to self-improve their situation, the efforts within preventive diplomacy are effectively 
constituting subjects which perform a certain form of security. These subjectivities are defined 
along very specific normative ideals, and are guided by a very specific framework which 
determines which subjects are to be constituted as experts or providers of security within this 
framework, and which forms of subjectivity that are to be excluded or targeted. In this way, 
preventive diplomacy internalise norms and practices which Abrahamsen describes as the 
constitution of ‘modern, self-disciplined citizens and states that can be trusted to govern 
themselves’ along a set of pre-established norms and disciplines (Abrahamsen 2004: 1454).  
 
Development Partners, Security Experts and Partners 
Despite the label “African solutions to African problems”, the IPSS is being developed in a 
complex system of relations involving partners, donors, and experts from all over the world. In 
the Danish development engagement with IGAD under the Africa Program for Peace (APP) 
IGAD receives annual budget support in exchange for annual work plans, progress reports, 
financial statements etc. (TANA 2013). This shows how donors ‘have increasingly targeted their 
support on improving standards of data collection, analysis and assessment processes’ which 
‘fuels the proliferation of reviews, plans, strategies, and policies that are required from 
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developing countries’ as technologies of security management (Death 2013: 778). In addition, the 
IPSS is constituted in a large network of academic security “experts”. Academic institutions such 
as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Nairobi and the Institute for Peace and Security 
Studies at Addis Ababa University, alongside a wide range of international experts and think 
tanks, are examples of how external knowledge deemed “scientific” comes to guide and 
legitimate security politicsiii. Huysmann (2006) and Bigo (2008) describes this technocratic form 
of politics as a process where cognitive authority is delegated to those who work inside the game 
of security and formulates e.g. policy recommendations, and taken away from those who stand 
outside, e.g. critical scholars. 
The forms of knowledge promoted in development partnerships very much orders security 
governance in the region along what Death (2013) has called ‘pervasive global discourses of 
development planning’. As such, the “new” forms of knowledge that are produced about security 
on the Horn of Africa are conditioned by concepts and categories which are standardized across 
multiple different forms of development engagements, across multiple different sectors, across 
multiple sovereign borders. This shows clearly that the ‘power of partnerships does not lie 
primarily in relations of domination, but in techniques of cooperation and inclusion’ 
(Abrahamsen 2004: 1454). As techniques of security are networked across a wide range of 
sectors and professionals they constitute a certain global ‘truth’ about security. The subjectivities 
formed by this relation are defined as self-governing and self-disciplined rather than subversive 
and controllable, but are nevertheless subjected to a certain discursive logic and expected to 
comply with its self-enforcing legitimacy. Similarly, cooperation with universities, think tanks 
and ‘security experts’ becomes operationalized and schematized in relation to a certain ‘logic’ of 
security. Security is thus constituted, not exclusively by elected politicians, but also by ‘security 
experts’ that work outside the rules of the normal game of politics.   
 
Sum-up & Reflections 
While certainly, IGAD maintains the respect for sovereign borders and the principle of non-
interference in national affairs, its discursive underpinnings and realm of practices promote a 
liberal governmentality. IGAD seeks to “know” its population through surveillance and 
monitoring. This moves security away from the exceptional punishment of the sovereign ruler, 
aimed at the individual, and towards the continuous management of the entire population through 
certain governmental techniques and technologies. These techniques and technologies are based 
on a regime of knowledge, where numbers, quantitative data and numeric analysis come to 
condition the possibility of knowledge. This Governmentality works by constituting subjectivities 
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that are capable of self-government and self-improvement, such as local mediation teams, and at 
the same time identify, target and exclude those who are not. To provide security, projections of 
force, such as the disruption of demonstrations, intervention in pastoral conflicts or peace 
operations, are weighed according to cost-benefit calculations, risk assessments, and probability 
scenarios. Through such calculations certain spaces and certain populations are constructed and 
defined as being in need of security, whilst others are excluded. Formerly referred to as 
ungoverned space, borderlands become fields of visibility than can be disciplined and governed. 
And through aid partnerships, and security experts the IPSS becomes a dispositif of security; a 
heterogeneous network of security practices that enforces and amplify a specific logic of security.  
 
Relocating Governmentality:  
Glocal Security, Postcolonial Agency & Subjectivity 
 
Putting the ‘Local’ in Global 
One cannot simply assume the uniformity between an idealized and general observation of global 
governmentality of security and its local appropriation. Arising from a lack of hegemonic 
structures are a multiple of points of resistance and appropriation that redefine, appropriate or 
seek to disrupt the normative structures of the dominant system of relations (Scott 1992; 
Bachmann 2010; Bachmann and Hönke 2010; Richmond 2010; Bayart 2009). While this is 
certainly an important contribution to the way we understand the techniques of rule and the 
possibility of governance today, it fails to point to the subtle ways in which a diverse field of 
security managers are in fact networking diverse, heterogeneous governmental practices, 
discourses and technologies of security across borders, institutions and professionals. I want to 
argue here that the IPSS is at once a localisation of global knowledge and a worldling of local 
experience. As late modern security threats are omnidirectional and omnipresent, this global 
dispositif must embrace the widest spatial and temporal field possible through e.g. risk 
management technologies. IGAD adopts this rationale through its emphasis on preventing, 
premediating and pre-empting threats, emergencies and catastrophes from spiralling out of 
control through e.g. emergency response units and local mediation teams. Yet, exactly because, 
increasingly, security is defined in its constant uncertainty, scientists, experts and security 
professionals must continuously explore and widen their knowledge to assist the governmental 
efforts of the state. Similarly, the IPSS promotes reflexivity, i.e. continuous evaluation of its 
practices through scientific knowledge such as audit reports, policy recommendation etc. in a 
complex network of local-, global-, private-, corporate-, and non-governmental actors.  
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The IPSS clearly becomes an extension of a liberal Governmentality which combines biopolitical 
technologies of power that examines the subjects under its gaze with disciplinary and sovereign 
punishment, expecting compliance to its acts of violence and punishment towards those who are 
deemed threats. While it is a governmental rationality that conditions the practices of security 
promoted by IGAD, at the same time, IGAD is enforcing and enacting this very Governmentality. 
As such, the global experience of security becomes localised, while local security issues are, in 
turn, transnationalised. This “dual” logic shows how security becomes a constitutive relation of 
power/knowledge; a strategy that “orders” security through regimes of knowledge which, in turn, 
constitutes governmental practices and discourses through its claim to “know” security. As its 
essential referent object is life, and not the sovereign state, practices of security must have as the 
object of control the transnational, or global, space of politics. The question is how this influences 
the way we must view international politics. How are we, for example, to conceptualize agency in 
this entanglement? 
 
Agency & Governmentality 
To Bhabha (1994), international relations are pre-determined and pre-scripted by the colonial 
legacy. Yet, Bhabha did not simply perceive these structures as oppositional to postcolonial 
agency. In achieving access to the international in the postcolonial era, the postcolonial subjects 
is given an opportunity to ‘translate’ and appropriate the normative orders which, in turn, makes 
possible new formations that reconstitute the international (ibid: 25). These hybrid-sites mark the 
areas in the international where ‘order’ is not so easily determined and existing codifications of 
power are unstable and open to disruption (ibid). But what if a governmental strategy of security 
is in fact able to capture these forms of agency in the matrices of practices and discourses that it 
constitutes? What my analysis of IPSS unveils is how localised practices and discourses of 
security governance are connected to the global level through the political formation of 
subjectivities, the constitution of which is at once enabled and constrained by global relations of 
power. At work here is a double logic of international politics.  
While the former colonial nations have, through declarations of independence, become 
recognized actors on the international scene of politics, the very constitution of international 
politics has its roots in the colonial era. Thus, ‘postcolonial agency derives from modes of 
articulation already scripted elsewhere’ and thus even when capacity building or local ownership 
is brought into the frame ‘the terms through which these are understood … pre-determine the 
agency of the postcolonial subject’ (Jabri 2014: 377). As such, even localised actors and practices 
of security governance in postcolonial regions are already and always part of a global relation of 
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power/knowledge. Regional information centres, local emergency response units, community-
driven mediation teams, private partnerships and development cooperation all show how the IPSS 
is emphasizing the role of local actors, and reinforcing these with resources. Yet, ss I have 
already argued, through these technologies, the region becomes enmeshed in a specific logic of 
security; a Governmentality, or strategy of power, which works through practices of freedom. 
Postcoloniality is nothing more than the reconfiguration of a strategy of power which continues to 
condition knowledge, practices and discourses. Even localised actors and practices of security 
governance in postcolonial regions are already and always part of a global relation of 
power/knowledge. This challenges traditional notions of agency and subjectivity. While 
subjectivity is ‘produced and constituted in and through matrices of discourse and power’ agency 
‘emerges from this constitution, so that the enactment of agency draws from this constitutive 
backdrop, and is indeed variously enabled and constrained by it’ (ibid: 375). We do not simply 
observe here a relation of force where a certain form of security governance is imposed on the 
Horn of Africa. Rather, it is through the use of freedom as a strategy of power that the IPSS 
constitutes a certain form of subjectivity conditioned by liberal governmentality. The IPSS 
promotes local agency, i.e. the postcolonial idea of “African solutions to African problems”, but 
at the same time, these agents are expected to act in compliance with a political rationality based 
on a transnational set of ‘truths’ which come to condition the possibilities of agency.  
 
Whose Security? Some Critical Reflections 
This discussion on the way in which a rationality of governance comes to condition the formation 
of agency and subjectivity on the Horn of Africa feeds directly into a wider critical discussion on 
global security responses. The question of ‘whose security’ is thus not an attempt to simply 
determine the political objective of security. Rather, it starts from the observation that the politics 
of security is ‘increasingly organised around debates and struggles over what [or who] should be 
governed through liberal forms of government and what [or who] should be governed through 
police forms of government’ (Neumann & Sending 2010) rather than an epistemological debate 
that questions the onto-theological status the concept has achieved. Because the liberal 
governmentality of ‘governing without government’ works through the logic of freedom, the 
global dispositif of security ‘does not produce a unified strategy but is rather an effect of 
anonymous multiple struggles, which nevertheless contribute to a globalization of domination’ 
(Bigo 2008: 7). Dillon & Reid (2009) has fittingly characterized this liberal logic of control and 
violence as killing to make life live. What this paradoxical statement entails is that the politics of 
security is as much defined by practices of division and exclusion as integration and inclusion. 
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The technologies deployed to ‘know’ a population so as to better manage its many needs in life 
chances becomes, then, also technologies of violence and control.  
Statistics, forecasts, and plausibility scenarios are all techniques used to provide security and to 
prevent potential risks or catastrophes of spiralling out of control. Yet, data and mathematical 
models do not simply predict; it constitutes the future based on the images of the present, or the 
life of those whom it seeks to protect.  As Der Derian (2001: 305) states, one of the most 
problematic consequences of this global data regime is that it has given birth to new forms of 
surveillant management that can be characterized as ‘a cybernetic system that displays the classic 
symptoms of advanced paranoia: hyper-vigilance, intense distrust, rigid and judgmental thought 
processes, and projection of one's own repressed beliefs and hostile impulses onto another’. As 
the referent object for security becomes bios, or life, it is biology, or human as species, that 
comes to be the knowledge which conditions it. Foucault (2003) called this the ‘race-war 
discourse’ in his 1976 lectures on the Birth of Biopolitics, whose essential goal is to maintain ‘the 
regulatory functions of the normalizing society’ which ‘makes possible the continued expression 
of sovereignty in an era of biopolitics’ (Mutimer 2007: 168). Race becomes the metric of division 
of security and, in turn, the constitution of a liberal ‘necropolitics’ (Dillon & Neal 2008: 170). 
Torture, extrajudicial killings, drone attacks and global renditions of suspected terrorists are all 
practices employed to protect “us”, the human, against the “other”, or non-human. It is the 
discursive rendering of this other as being barely life, unworthy of the distribution of liberal 
values (Agamben 2008; Butler 2009). The ‘borderlands’ has not been eradicated by the liberal 
governmentality; it has merely shifted the limits of civilization elsewhere. 
The complex, and omnipresent nature of threats and the proliferation of ‘risk’ means that security 
can never be ‘achieved’, and so there will always be the need for security measures to defend 
society. Security understood as governmentality, or technique of governance, has no stated end 
goal. It is instead an ethos of continuous management and adaptation to the treacherous dangers 
of modernity. As sovereign security, pursued through wars against other nations at the limit of the 
state-system, becomes instead governmentalized practices, it directs it technologies of violence 
inwards, at the control of populations. To paraphrase Foucault, security becomes the pursuit of 
war by other means. These practices seeks to essentially kill threatening others who are 
identified, excluded or killed, to protect and increase the life chances of those deemed worthy of 
living. These points carry with them huge implications for the way we are to judge security 
practices in ethical terms; implications which must, be at the heart of any critical enquiry into the 
politics of security. Does this mean there is no value in attempting to formulate a different kind of 
security? Should we merely seek to criticize that which is? No. But, but the formulation of an 
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ethical response relies heavily on an understanding of how security responses in multiple locales 
of the globe come to be defined along a specific political rationality. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, how are practices and discourses of regional security governance on the Horn of 
Africa conditioned by a global (liberal) governmentality, and with what consequences? The 
liberal governmentality of security uses freedom as a strategy of power, and hides its use of 
violence behind its imperative to protect. As threats to human life become omnipresent, 
omnidirectional and contingent, the risk regime demands practices which take as their focus 
populations as such, and seek to come to know these through monitoring, surveillance and 
forecasting. These practices seek to divide populations on a global scale in order to determine 
who are to be governed through liberal techniques, and who are to be controlled, punished or 
killed. Despite labels of local ownership and African empowerment, I have shown how this 
rationality comes to define security practices on the Horn of Africa. Through early warning 
mechanisms, rapid response units, and citizen diplomacy the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy 
seeks to transform the Horn of Africa into a field of visibility. This requires technologies of 
control that examines the population, projections of force which discipline and punish, and the 
constitution of self-governing, self-improving subjectivities which enact this rationale.  
As such, security governance on the Horn of Africa is at once localisation of a global rationality 
and a “wordling” of local experience. The (global) Governmentality of security conditions 
security practices on the Horn, and security practices on the Horn in turn enacts and enforces this 
very rationale. As a consequence, a “truth” of security is networked across borders, institutions, 
professions and organizations. As such, the division between what, or who, must be protected, 
and what, or who, must be disciplined, punished or killed is constituted globally. These points 
carry with them huge implications for how we perceive subjectivity, agency and how we might 
think ethically about global politics today. As many have pointed out, this is not a hegemonic 
structure of domination. It is a loose-knit, heterogeneous system of relations open to disruption. 
Yet, as a dominant logic comes to influence security practices in multiple locales of the globe, 
how might we imagine an alternative? As even agency comes to be pre-scripted, how can the 
political subject reconstitute the international? The task is not only to criticize that which is. But 
formulating an ethical response requires examining the way in which a certain Governmentality 
conditions (security) governance in multiple locales of the globe. 
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Notes 
                                           
i
 Here defined geographically as consisting of Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and 
Ethiopia, with Kenya and DRC as a peripheral members 
ii
 As has been argued by influential scholars such as Morgenthau (1964) and Kaplan (2000) 
iii
 Examples include: The ISS, funded by a pool of international donors, publishes reports focused on 
policy recommendation for the AUPSC, and the IPSS. ; and TANA, an academic consultancy group is 
tasked with coming up with strategic objectives as well as operationalization of e.g. the IPSS as part 
of the Danish Africa Programme for Peace 
